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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GORDON L. WEIGH·T, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs.-
H:\HHY B. MILLER, and HARRY B . 
. MiLLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10037 
This is an action by Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight to 
re(·ovpr on a promissory note in the amount of $1,200.00 
and executed in his favor by Defendant Harry B. Miller 
on the 2nd day of January, 1960. 
DISPOSITIOX IN THE LOvVER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
rtah, with Judge Merrill C. Faux presiding, awarded 
judg11wnt to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,200.00, $92.00 
interPst, attorney's fees in the amount of $348.33 and 
$15.00 costs. 
RELIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Harry B. :Miller seeks reversal of the 
derision of the lower court. Plaintiff Gordon L. \V eight 
:'l'Pks affirn1ance of the lower court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent shall hereinafter be referred to as Plain-
tiff and Appellant shall hereinafter be referred to as 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff accepts Defendant's Statement of Facts 
except in certain particulars noted as follows. Plaintiff 
does not concede that Plaintiff initiated the conversation 
with respect to entering into an employment agreement. 
Plaintiff denies that Defendant was specifically relying 
upon the payment by Plaintiff of the balance of $3~800.00 
in order to purchase ~ certain printing press. Plaintiff 
does not agree that Defendant often reminded him that 
the balance of $3,800.00 was due but states affirn1atively 
that the Plaintiff did not specify any particular time 
within which the balance should be paid. (R,..ll) Plain-
tiff asserts that he did not state to the bookkeeper Ruth 
Marks on the 18th of January, 1960, that he was employed 
elsewhere at the time. (R-40) Plaintiff further asserts 
that he did not break appointments with customers 
and did not evidence a loss of interest in his work. 
Plaintiff further denies that Defendant ever offered 
to pay him stock of the corporation as pay1nent of the 
promissory note. (R-21) 
On the 1st day of October, 1959, Plaintiff and 
Defendant entered into an Employn1ent Agreement. The 
terms are essentially as set forth in Defendant's State-
ment of Facts. Preriously the Plaintiff had paid to the 
Defendant $1,200.00 The Agreement contemplated a 
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promiHsory notP representing the invPstment made by 
1 )lnintiff. One such note was initially prepared for 
signatun· but was not signed by the Defendant. (R-10, 
29, 30) During Decentber, 1959, the Defendant beriame 
dissastisfied with Plaintiff's perfonnance, (R-28), re-
minded him of such, discussed the matter with Mr. 
~lontgomery, Plaintiff's attorney at the time (R-98), 
and as a result of such dissatisfaction stated to Plaintiff 
that he would discontinue paying him a salary and 
instead pay him a 10% commission of sales. R-28) 
.:\H a result of such condition imposed Plaintiff became 
dissatisfied with the working relationship and the em-
ployment arrangement was mutually terminated. 
As a cumulation of such termination the Defendant 
executed a promissory note on January 2, 1960, repre-
senting the initial amount invested by Plaintiff .. (R-3, 
39, 73, and P-1). Since the rnoney was invested in Sep-
tt•mber, 1959, the note was dated as of Septe~nber, 1959, 
in order to entitle Plaintiff to interest from that date. 
(R-73). 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMING DE·CISION OF 
LOWER COURT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS 
:\IUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT .. THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,200.00 
WAS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH TERM!-
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NATION AND THEREFORE HAD NO RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. 
In considerin~ the soundness of the trial courts' 
findings and judgment this .court may indulge in the 
presumption that the judgment was valid and was based 
upon competent evidence. The evidence and all infer· 
ences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom 
tnust be viewed in light most favorable to it. The burden 
here is upon the Defendant in affirmatively showing that 
the trial court was in error. The following authorities 
are cited in support of the foregoing propositions: 
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961); 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963). 
'The trier of fact can best judge the credibility of the 
witness and the weight to be given the evidence for he 
can observe firsthand their demeanor, forthrightness 
and candor. Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 U 
612, 244 P2d 640; Page v. Federal Security Insurance 
Co., 8 U2d 226, 332 P2d 666 ( 1958). 
The evidence substantiates the court's findings that 
the parties had tern1inated the employment relationship 
and that the note in question was executed after such 
termination and, therefore, had no relationship with the 
employment agreement. In support of such contention 
Plaintiff submits the following points: 
(1) The Defendant was dissatisfied with the per· 
formance of the Plaintiff and especially so in December, 
1959. (R-72, 76). He felt so keen about the matter that 
the D·efendant left Plaintiff notes or memos reminding 
him about the fact that he was not earning as much as 
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he was being paid. (R-27). 
'(2) The Defendant contacted Mr. }.fontgomery, 
Plaintiff's attorney at the time, and discussed the matter 
with him. On that occasion the Defendant stated that 
he was .. afraid he was going to have to let him go." It 
is t-'ignificant that the Defendant felt so keenly about the 
mattPr that he felt prompted to discuss the matter with 
Mr. Montgomery. (R-98). 
( 3) Between January 2, 1960, and January 18, 1960, 
the Defendant had no contact with the Plaintiff and did 
not eall him in order to inquire as to the reason for the 
Plaintiff not working. Such action on Defendant's part 
was certainly consistant with the position that the 
Defendant considered the employment relationship 
terminated ( R-85, 86). 
( 4) In Decetnber, 1959, the Defendant imposed as a 
condition of future employment that the Plaintiff should 
be paid on a 10% commission basis instead of a regular 
salary. Such condition was at variance with the terms 
of the Employment Agreement. The commission basis 
was to be retroactive to December 15th. The Defendant 
refused to pay the Plaintiff for the last two weeks in 
December. ( R-27, 28). 
( 5) The Plaintiff too was dissatisfied with the em-
ployment relationship. Defendant had not allowed him 
to participate in management and it was not his under-
standing that he should remain pennanently as a sales-
man. (R-:27, 28). 
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( 6) On January 2, 1960, the Defendant at Plaintiff's 
request, executed the promissory note on a blank printed 
form secured from an office supply company. (R-39, 
73, P-1. The note was initially dated January 2, 1960, 
but this date was crossed out and the date September 
1, 1959, was inserted. This was for the sole reason of 
entitling the Plaintiff to interest from the date of his 
initial investment. (R-73). It is significant that the note 
made no mention of the Employment Agreement or that 
the proceeds should be paid in stock. (P-1). The note 
was made after the termination of the Ernployment 
Agreement and is unequivocal with respect to the mode 
of payment. 
(7) The Plaintiff and Defendant conversed about 
the repayment of note at a tirne subsequent to its exe-
cution. This conversation took place outside of the 
State Purchasing Office of the State Capitol. On that 
occasion the Defendant evidenced some concern about the 
Plaintiff trying to "peddle the note" and thereupon 
indicated that he would pay off the note. (R-21, 22). 
No mention was made, however, about paying the note 
off in stock. 
(8) While it is true, as Defendant asserts, that the 
initial investment was made in contemplation of sub-
sequently receiving stock in the Lorraine Press after it 
it was incorporated, it was also true that these matters 
never did materialize during the course of Plaintiff's 
employment. It is also true that a note was prepared 
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for D~fPndant's signature. (R-10, 29, 39). This note 
wa~ never signed. The note that eventually was executed 
was PXP<'nh•d after the agreement was tenninated and 
was not the note contemplated in the agreement. It was 
not for the sa1ne amount and made no reference to the 
('ontract or agreement and made no reference to the 
fact that the payment should be n1ade in stock. 
From the foregoing evidence the court could have 
justifiably held that the employment agreement was 
tPrminated in a number of ways. Written contracts may 
be rescinded by oral agreements. 12 Am. J ur., Contracts 
~ 432; Restatement, Contracts. Vol. 2 § 407. They may 
also be rescinded or terminated by implication as a 
result of the acts of the parties. An example of such 
is where the contracting parties subsequently make a 
new contract ineonsistent with the term sof the former 
agrePment, as Plaintiff and Defendant did in the present 
ca-:~. 12 Am. J ur., Contracts, ~433; Restatement, Con-
traets, Vol. 2, ~508; Copper King !-fining Co, v. Han-
son, 52 lTtah, 605, 176 P. 623. On January 2, 1960, 
some three months after the execution of the mnployn1ent 
agreement, the Defendant executed the note in question. 
And a.s has been repeatedly stated this note made no 
mention of the employment agreement or that the pre-
<'~eds should be paid in stock. Therefore, such note was 
inconsistent with the terms of the former agreement. 
The lower eourt could also have based its decision 
on the fact that the contract was rescinded or termin-
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ated because of a n1aterial breach by the Defendant. It 
12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § -±-±0; Hestateinent, Contracts, 
is well settled that a 1naterial breach warrants n't-;cission. 
Vol. 2, § 397; ~,LcBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12; 2-±9 Pac. 
114. Certainly the Defendant's apparent r<>fusal to sign 
the initial promissory note prepared or his refusal 
to pay the Plaintiff a wage would constitute material 
breaches. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER IN DETER-
MINING THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
WAS MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY 
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The Pre-Trial Order states as follows: "The only 
question for the trial court to determine will be whether 
or not the note in question is any part of the contract 
attached to the answer." The inquiry and testimony 
during the trial related to whether or not the note in 
question was a part of the e1nployment agreement. Much 
of the testimony dealt with whether the Plaintiff nnd 
Defendant terminated their en1ploy1nent relationship. 
This testimony was certainly material to the basic 
question involved, for if the employment relationship 
was terminated as the court found then the promissory 
signed note into evidence. 
Plaintiff's cross examination exceeded the scope of 
Defendant's direct examination. That one exception 
was with respect to the admission of the original un-
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tt i~ well settled that a party nmy not complain to the 
npp<•al court about the ilnproper adinission of evidence 
whieh lw himself has introduced of elicited. 5 Am. Jur., 
.\p1wal und ~ITor, § C>(i~, 717. Lowman v. Kuecker, 246 
lowa 1~~i, il N\Y2d 586, 52 ALR 2d 1380. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the trial court 
did not err in holding that the pron1issory note in ques-
tion was a separate and distinct obligation from the 
employ1nent agreement. Even though the note related 
to the initial $1,200.00 investment by Plaintiff it was 
PXPeuted after Plaintiff and Defendant mutually term-
inated their relationship. The note made no mention 
of the employment agreement or that it was to be paid 
in stock. The court did not go beyond the scope of the 
pre-trial order; the evidence from which the court based 
it~ findings was supplied by Defendant's witnesses and 
wa~ submited without objection from Defendant that 
t1w testimony was beyond the scope of the pre-trial order. 
The pre-trial order limited the issues to an inquiry as 
to whether or not the note in question was related to 
tlw employment agreement. Implicit within such inquiry 
was the determination whether or not the employment 
note which was subsequently executed was not part of the 
contract as Defendant contends. 
The lower court did not alter the terms of the 
employment agreement by requiring that re-payment 
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of Plaintiff's investment be made in ''money" instead of 
"stock" as Defendant alleges. The court held, and 
justifiably so, that the employ1nent contract was termin-
ated at the tin1e the note was executed. Therefore, it 
had no relationship with the agreement. As such the 
note existed as a separate obligation according to the 
terms therein which provided for the payment in money. 
The Defendant's point that the trial court went 
beyond the scope of the pre-trial order is not well taken. 
All of the evidentiary matters considered were necessary 
and incidental to the basic question established by the 
pre-trial order. Even assuming that the court exceeded 
the scope of the pre-trial order. Defendant's position 
is without merit. The doctrine of "vVaiver" and "In-
vited Error" have application here. It is significant 
that with the exception a few basic inquiries submitted 
to Plaintiff by his counsel on direct examination, (R-2, 3) 
all of the testimony elicited was from defendant's wit-
nesses. The Defendant even made the Plaintiff his 
witness. The testimony upon which the trial court based 
its decision was elicited from Defendant's witnesses. It 
is noteworthy that with one exception the Defendant 
did not object to the admission of the testimony of the 
various witnesses nor did he object that the scope of 
agreement was operative at the time the note was exe-
cuted. The court held that it was not, and rightly so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAYNE B. FORBES 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent 
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